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Abstract. Ride-sharing services are gaining popularity and are crucial for a sus-
tainable environment. A special case in which such services are most applicable,
is the last mile variant. In this variant it is assumed that all the passengers are
positioned at the same origin location (e.g. an airport), and each have a different
destination. One of the major issues in a shared ride is fairly splitting of the ride
cost among the passengers.
In this paper we use the Shapley value, which is one of the most significant solu-
tion concepts in cooperative game theory, for fairly splitting the cost of a shared
ride. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario there exists a fixed prior-
ity order in which the passengers are dropped-off (e.g. elderly, injured etc.), and
we show a method for efficient computation of the Shapley value in this setting.
Our results are also applicable for efficient computation of the Shapley value in
routing games.
In the second scenario there is no predetermined priority order. We show that the
Shapley value cannot be efficiently computed in this setting. However, extensive
simulations reveal that our approach for the first scenario can serve as an excellent
proxy for the second scenario, outperforming other known proxies.
1 Introduction
On-demand ride-sharing services, which group together passengers with similar itineraries,
can be of significant social and environmental benefit, by reducing travel costs, road
congestion and CO2 emissions. Indeed, the National Household Travel Survey per-
formed in the U.S. in 2009 [19] revealed that approximately 83.4% of all trips in the
U.S. were in a private vehicle (other options being public transportation, walking, etc.).
The average vehicle occupancy was only 1.67 when compensating for the number of
passengers. The deployment of autonomous cars in the near future is likely to increase
the spread for ride-sharing services, since it will be easier and cheaper for a company to
handle a fleet of autonomous cars that can serve the demands of different passengers.
Most works in the domain of ride-sharing are dedicated to the assignment of pas-
sengers to vehicles, or to planning optimal drop-off routes [18,1,14]. In this paper we
study a fair allocation of the cost of the shared ride in the last mile variant [6]. That
is, we analyze the cost allocation when all passengers are positioned at the same origin
location. We concentrate on the Shapley value [20] as our notion of fair cost allocation.
The Shapley value is widely used in cooperative games, and is the only cost alloca-
tion satisfying efficiency, symmetry, null player property and additivity. The Shapley
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value has been even termed the most important normative division scheme in coopera-
tive game theory [22]. However, the Shapley value depends on the travel cost of a ride
of each subset of the passengers. Therefore, as stated by O¨zener and Ergun [16], “In
general, explicitly calculating the Shapley value requires exponential time. Hence, it is
an impractical cost-allocation method unless an implicit technique given the particular
structure of the game can be found”.
There are two possible general structures of the last-mile ride-sharing problem. In
some cases there is a priority order in which the passengers are dropped-off. Such pri-
oritization may be attributed to the order in which the passengers arrived at the origin
location, or the frequency of passenger usage of the service; the latter is similar to the
different boarding groups on an aircraft. Other rationales for prioritization may include
urgency of arrival or priority groups in need (e.g. elderly, disabled, pregnant women,
and the injured). Clearly, in such cases, the prioritization is preserved when determin-
ing the travel cost of a ride with a subset of the passengers. We denote this problem
as the prioritized ride-sharing problem. Indeed, in some scenarios there is no prede-
termined prioritization order. In such cases it is assumed that a ride with a subset of
the passengers is performed using the shortest (or cheapest) path that traverses their
destinations. We denote this problem as the non-prioritized ride-sharing problem.
Our problems of cost allocation are closely related to traveling salesman games [17].
In these games, a service provider makes a round-trip along the locations of several
sponsors, where the total cost of the trip should be distributed among the sponsors.
Specifically, the prioritized ride-sharing problem is similar to the fixed-route traveling
salesman game, also known as routing game [23], while the non-prioritized ride-sharing
problem is similar to the traveling salesman game. Most of the works on traveling sales-
man games concentrated on finding an element of the core, a solution game concept
which is different from the Shapley value. One exception is the work of Yengin [23],
who has studied the Shapley value of routing games and has conjectured that there is
no efficient way for computing the Shapley value in routing games.
In this paper, we show an efficient computation of the Shapley value for the prior-
itized ride-sharing problem. Our method is based on smart enumeration of the compo-
nents that are used in the computation of the Shapley value. Furthermore, our approach
can be generalized to routing games, and we thus also provide an efficient way for com-
puting the Shapley value in routing game. We then move to analyze the non-prioritized
ride-sharing problem and show that, unless P=NP, there is no polynomial time algorithm
for computing the Shapley value. Fortunately, we show through extensive simulations
that when the given travel path is the shortest path the Shapley value of the prioritized
ride-sharing problem can be used as an excellent proxy for the Shapley value of the
non-prioritized ride-sharing problem.
We note that the term ride-sharing is used in the literature with different meanings.
We consider only the setting where the vehicle operator does not have any preferences
or predefined destination. Instead, the vehicle’s route is determined solely by the pas-
sengers’ requests. In addition, the context of our work is that the assignment of the
passengers to the vehicle has already been determined, either by a ride-sharing system
or by the passengers themselves, and we only need to decide on the cost allocation.
Since we focus on the case where the assignment has already been determined, we do
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not consider the ability of passengers to deviate from the given assignment and join
a different vehicle, which is acceptable since either they want to travel together or no
other alternative exists.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are two-fold:
1. We show an efficient method for computing the Shapley value of each user in a
shared-ride when the priority order is predetermined. Our solution entails that the
Shapley value can be computed in polynomial time in routing games as well, which
is in contrast to a previous conjecture made.
2. We show that, while there exist no polynomial algorithm for computing the Shapley
value of the non-prioritized ride-sharing problem (unless P=NP), the Shapley value
of the prioritized ride-sharing problem can be used as an excellent proxy for the
Shapley value of the non-prioritized ride-sharing problem (under the assumption
that the provided travel path is the shortest path).
2 Related Work
The ride-sharing cost allocation problems that we study are closely related to traveling
salesman games [17]. Specifically, the prioritized ride-sharing problem is similar to the
fixed-route traveling salesman game [9,17,3], also known as routing game [23].
One variant of routing game is the fixed-route traveling salesman problems with
appointments. In this variant the service provider is assumed to travel back home (to
the origin) when she skips a sponsor. This variant was introduced by Yengin [23], who
also showed how to efficiently compute the Shapley value for this problem but stated
that his technique does not carry over to routing games.
The prioritized ride-sharing problem can also be interpreted as a generalization of
the airport problem [12] to a two dimensional plane. In the airport problem we need
to decide how to distribute the cost of an airport runway among different airlines who
need runways of different lengths. In our case we distribute the cost among passengers
who need rides of different lengths and destinations. It was shown that the Shapley
value can be efficiently computed for the airport problem, however achieving efficient
computation of the Shapley value in our setting requires a different technique.
The Shapley value for the traveling salesman game, which is related to our non-
prioritized ride-sharing problem, has rarely received serious attention in the literature,
due to its computational complexity. Notably, Aziz et al. [2] suggested a number of
direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value for the traveling
salesman game. They further surveyed several proxies for the Shapley value that are
relatively easy to compute, and experimentally evaluate their performance. We develop
a proxy for the Shapley value for the non-prioritized ride-sharing problem which is
based on the Shapley-value for the prioritized ride-sharing problem, and compare its
performance with proxies that are based on the work of Aziz et al.
The problem of fair cost allocation was also studied in the context of logistic oper-
ation. In this domain, shippers collaborate and bundle their shipment requests together
to achieve better rates from a carrier [11]. The Shapley value was also investigated in
this domain of collaborative transportation [10,21]. In particular, O¨zener and Ergun [16]
stated that “we do not know of an efficient technique for calculating the Shapley value
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for the shippers’ collaboration game”. Indeed, Fiestras-Janeiro et al. [8] developed the
line rule, which is inspired by the Shapley value, but requires less computational effort
and relates better with the core. However, the line rule is suitable for a specific inventory
transportation problem. O¨zener [15] describes an approximation of the Shapley Value
when trying to simultaneously allocate both the transportation costs and the emissions
among the customers. Overall, we note that the main requirements from a cost allo-
cation in the context of logistic operation is stability, and an equal distribution of the
profit, since the collaboration is assumed to be long-termed. The type of interaction is
our setting is inherently different, as it is an ad-hoc short term collaboration.
In another domain, Bistaffa et al. [4] introduce a fair payment scheme, which is
based on the game theoretic concept of the kernel, for the social ride-sharing problem
(where the set of commuters are connected through a social network).
3 Preliminaries
We are given a weighted graph G(V,E) that represents a road network; V is the set
of possible locations, and E is a set of weighted edges that represents the set of roads.
We are given a set U = {u1, u2, ..., un} of passengers (users) that depart from the
same origin, d0 ∈ V . Without loss of generality, we assume that passenger u1 will
be dropped-off first, passenger u2 will be dropped off second, etc. Each passenger
ui has a corresponding destination di ∈ V . Let D ⊂ V be the set of destinations,
D = {d1, d2, ..., dn}. We denote by δ(di, dj) the shortest travel distance between di
and dj in G and δ(di, di) = 0. To simplify the notation we define a dummy destina-
tion, dn+1, such that for every i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}, δ(di, dn+1) = 0. Given a set S ⊆ D,
let c(S) be the cost associated with the subset S. That is, c(D) is the total travel cost
of the shared ride. We note that c(S), where S ( D, depends on the order in which
the passengers are dropped off, and therefore c(S) is defined differently in the priori-
tized ride-sharing problem and in the non-prioritized ride-sharing problem. The Shapley
value for a passenger ui is formally defined as:
φ(ui) =
∑
S⊆U\{i}
|S|!(|U | − |S| − 1)!
|U |!
(
c(S ∪ {i})− c(S)).
That is, the Shapley value is an average over the marginal costs of each passenger.
4 The Prioritized Ride-sharing Problem
In this section we assume that the passengers are ordered according to some predeter-
mined priority order, and efficiently compute the payment for every passenger using the
Shapley value. Unlike other related work [17], we do not require that the priority order
will be the optimal order that minimizes the total cost.
4.1 Notation
Given the set of passengers U , without loss of generality, we assume that passenger
u1 has the highest priority, passenger u2 has the second highest priority, etc. Given a
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set S ⊆ D, let S˜ be the set S ordered in an ascending order (according to the priority
order), and let S[i] be the destination that is in the i-th position in S˜. For ease of notation
we use S[0] to denote d0 and S[|S|+ 1] to denote dn+1.
Given a set S ⊆ D, let v(S) be the shortest travel distance of the path that starts
at the origin d0 and traverses all destinations di ∈ S according to an ascending order.
That is, v(S) =
|S|−1∑
i=0
δ(S[i], S[i + 1]). This value (v(S)) serves as the cost associated
with a subset of passengers, c(S), in the computation of the Shapley value.
Let R be a permutation on D and let PRi be the set of the previous destinations to
di in permutation R.
4.2 Efficient Computation of the Shapley Value
We are interested in determining the payment for each passenger, ui, according to the
Shapely value, φ(ui). The Shapley value has several equivalent formulas, and we use
the following formula to derive an efficient computation in the prioritized ride-sharing
problem:
φ(ui) =
1
n!
∑
R
(
v(PRi ∪ {di})− v(PRi )
)
.
Given a permutation R and a passenger ui, let dl ∈ PRi be a destination such that
l < i and ∀dj ∈ PRi , j ≤ l or i < j. If no such destination exists, then dl is defined
as d0. Similarly, let dr ∈ PRi be a destination such that i < r and ∀dj ∈ PRi , j < i
or r ≤ j. If no such destination exists, then dr is defined as dn+1. We use ` (and r)
to denote the position of dl (and dr) in the ordered P˜Ri , respectively. If dl = d0 then
` = 0, and if dr = dn+1 then r= |PRi |+ 1. We note that PRi [`] = dl, PRi [r] = dr and
r = `+ 1.
For example, assume D = {d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6} and R = {d6, d2, d5, d4, d3, d1},
we get PR4 = {d6, d2, d5} and thus P˜R4 = {d2, d5, d6}, dl = d2 (i.e., ` = 1), dr = d5
(i.e., r = 2), and PR4 [`] = d2.
Our first observation is that the computation of the Shapley value in our setting,
φ(ui), may be written as the sum over the distances between pairs of destinations.
Observation 1 φ(ui) = 1n!
n−1∑
p=0
n∑
q=p+1
αip,qδ(dp, dq), for some α
i
p,q ∈ Z.
Proof. We note that φ(ui) · n! is a sum over v(S) for multiple S ⊆ D. By definition,
v(S) =
|S|−1∑
j=0
δ(S[j], S[j+1]), such that S[j] = dp and S[j+1] = dq where p < q. uunionsq
We now show that we can rewrite the computation of the Shapely value in our
setting as follows.
Lemma 1.
φ(ui) =
1
n!
∑
R
(
δ(dl, di) + δ(di, dr)− δ(dl, dr)
)
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Proof.
v(PRi ) =
|PRi |−1∑
j=0
δ(PRi [j], P
R
i [j + 1]) =
`−1∑
j=0
δ(PRi [j], P
R
i [j + 1]) + δ(dl, dr) +
|PRi |−1∑
j=r
δ(PRi [j], P
R
i [j + 1])
In addition,
v(PRi ∪ {di}) =
`−1∑
j=0
δ(PRi [j], P
R
i [j + 1])+
δ(dl, di) + δ(di, dr) +
|PRi |−1∑
j=r
δ(PRi [j], P
R
i [j + 1]).
By definition,
φ(ui) =
1
n!
∑
R
[
v(PRi ∪ {di})− v(PRi )
]
=
1
n!
∑
R
(
`−1∑
j=0
δ(PRi [j], P
R
i [j +1]) + δ(dl, di) + δ(di, dr) +
|PRi |−1∑
j=r
δ(PRi [j], P
R
i [j +
1])−
( `−1∑
j=0
δ(PRi [j], P
R
i [j + 1]) + δ(dl, dr) +
|PRi |−1∑
j=r
δ(PRi [j], P
R
i [j + 1])
))
=
1
n!
∑
R
(
δ(dl, di) + δ(di, dr)− δ(dl, dr)
)
uunionsq
Following Observation 1 and Lemma 1 we now show that we can rewrite the compu-
tation of the Shapely value as a sum over distances, that can be computed in polynomial
time.
Theorem 2. For each i, φ(ui) =
i∑
p=0
n∑
q=i
βip,qδ(dp, dq), where q 6= p, and βip,q ∈ Q are
computed in polynomial time.
Proof. By definition, l < i < r. According to Lemma 1 φ(ui) · n! is a sum over
δ(dp, dq), where p ≤ i ≤ q. There are several terms in this sum:
– βi0,i multiplies δ(d0, di). Now, δ(d0, di) appears in φ(ui) in every permutation R
when dl = d0. That is, in all of the permutations where destination di appears
before any other destination dx such that x < i. We now count the number of
such permutations. There are
(
n
i
)
options to place the destinations d1, d2, ..., di
among the n available destinations. For each such option there are (i− 1)! options
to order the destinations d1, d2, ..., di such that di is the first destination among
them. Finally, there are (n− i)! options to order the destinations di+1, di+2, ..., dn.
Therefore, δ(d0, di) appears in
(
n
i
) · (i − 1)! · (n − i)! = n!i permutations, and by
inserting 1n! into the sum we get that β
i
0,i =
1
i .
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– For each q > i, βi0,q multiplies δ(d0, dq). Now, δ(d0, dq) appears negatively in
φ(ui) in every permutation R when dl = d0 and dr = dq . That is, in all of the
permutations where destination dq appears before di (i.e., dq ∈ PRi ), but any other
destination dx such that x < q, appears after di. We now count the number of such
permutations. There are
(
n
q
)
options to place the destinations d1, d2, ..., di, ..., dq
among the n available destinations. For each such option there are (q− 2)! options
to order the destinations d1, d2, ..., di such that dq is the first destination and di is
the second destination among them. Finally, there are (n− q)! options to order the
destinations dq+1, dq+2, ..., dn. Therefore, δ(d0, dq) appears negatively in
(
n
q
)·(q−
2)! · (n− q)! = n!q·(q−1) permutations, and by inserting 1n! into the sum we get that
βi0,q = − 1q·(q−1) .
– For each 0 < p < i, βip,i multiplies δ(dp, di). Now, δ(dp, di) appears in φ(ui)
in every permutation R when dl = dp. That is, in all of the permutations where
destination dp appears before di (i.e., dp ∈ PRi ), but any other destination dx such
that p < x < i, appears after di. We now count the number of such permutations.
There are
(
n
i−p+1
)
options to place the destinations dp, dp+1, ..., di among the n
available destinations. For each such option there are (i−p+1−2)! options to order
the destinations dp, dp+1, ..., di such that dp is the first destination and di is the
second destination among them. Finally, there are (n−(i−p+1))! options to order
the destinations d1, d2, ..., dp−1, di+1, di+2, ..., dn. Therefore, δ(dp, di) appears in(
n
i−p+1
) · (i − p − 1)! · (n − (i − p + 1))! = n!(i−p)·(i−p+1) permutations, and by
inserting 1n! into the sum we get that β
i
p,i =
1
(i−p)·(i−p+1) .
– For each q > i, βii,q multiplies δ(di, dq). Now, δ(di, dq) appears in φ(ui) in every
permutation R when dr = dq . That is, in all of the permutations where destination
dq appears before di (i.e., dq ∈ PRi ), but any other destination dx such that i <
x < q, appears after di. We now count the number of such permutations. There
are
(
n
q−i+1
)
options to place the destinations di, di+1, ..., dq among the n available
destinations. For each such option there are (q − i + 1 − 2)! options to order the
destinations di, di+1, ..., dq such that dq is the first destination and di is the second
destination among them. Finally, there are (n − (q − i + 1))! options to order
the destinations d1, d2, ..., di−1, dq+1, dq+2, ..., dn. Therefore, δ(dp, di) appears in(
n
q−i+1
) · (q − i − 1)! · (n − (q − i + 1))! = n!(q−i)·(q−i+1) permutations, and by
inserting 1n! into the sum we get that β
i
i,q =
1
(q−i)·(q−i+1) .
– For each p, q such that p < i < q, βip,q multiplies δ(dp, dq). Now, δ(dp, dq) appears
negatively in φ(ui) in every permutation R when dl = dp and dr = dq . That is,
in all of the permutations where destinations dp, dq appear before di (i.e., dp, dq ∈
PRi ), but any other destination dx such that p < x < q, x 6= i, appears after
di. We now count the number of such permutations. There are
(
n
q−p+1
)
options
to place the destinations dp, dp+1, ..., di, ..., dq among the n available destinations.
For each such option there are (q − p + 1 − 3)! options to order the destinations
dp, dp+1, ..., di, ..., dq such that dp is the first destination, dq is the second and di is
the third destination among them. Similarly, there are (q − p + 1 − 3)! options to
order these destinations such that dq is the first destination, dp is the second and di
is the third. Finally, there are (n − (q − p + 1))! options to order the destinations
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d1, d2, ..., dp−1, dq+1, dq+2, ..., dn. Therefore, δ(dp, dq) appears in
(
n
q−p+1
)·2·(q−
p−2)! · (n− (q−p+1))! = 2·n!(q−p−1)·(q−p)·(q−p+1) permutations, and by inserting
1
n! into the sum we get that β
i
p,q = − 2(q−p−1)·(q−p)·(q−p+1) . uunionsq
We note that the prioritized ride-sharing problem is very similar to the setting of
routing games [17]. The model of routing games is of one service provider that makes
a round-trip along the locations of several sponsors in a fixed order, where the total cost
of the trip should be distributed among the sponsors. Clearly, our problem is almost
identical: the service provider corresponds to the vehicle and the sponsors correspond
to the passengers. The only difference is that in a routing game the sponsors also pay
the cost of the trip back to the origin. Indeed, the results presented in this section carry
over to routing games.
Theorem 3. The Shapley value in routing games can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof (Proof (sketch)). We use our previous definitions and results with the following
slight modifications. The dummy destination dn+1 becomes d0. Thus, δ(di, dn+1) =
δ(di, d0). In Observation 1 we need to modify the bound in the outer sum (with the
index p) to n and the bound in the inner sum (with the index q) to n + 1. In addition,
we use the proof of Theorem 2, but we add
i∑
p=0
βip,n+1δ(dp, dn+1) to the calculation of
φ(ui), where for p < i, βip,n+1 = − 1(n−p)·(n−p+1) and βii,n+1 = 1n−i+1 . uunionsq
Note that this is an unexpected result, since it refutes the conjecture in [23] that there is
no efficient way for computing the Shapley value in routing games.
5 Non-prioritized Ride-sharing Problem
Similar to the prioritized ride-sharing problem we are given an initial priority order,
which determines the drop-off order of the passengers. However, in the non-prioritized
variant we do not enforce the fixed order for every subset of passengers. Instead, given
a strict subset of passengers S, the cost associated with it, c(S), is the length of the
shortest path that traverses all of the destinations of the passengers in S.
5.1 The Hardness of the Non-prioritized Ride-sharing Problem
In Section 4 we showed that we can efficiently compute the Shapley value for the pri-
oritized ride-sharing problem. In essence, the computation could be done efficiently
since most of the travel distances cancel out, and only a polynomial number of terms
remain in the computation. Unfortunately, this is not the case with the non-prioritized
ride-sharing problem, where the Shapley value cannot be computed efficiently unless
P = NP .
Clearly, finding the length of the shortest path (not necessarily a simple path) that
starts at a specific node, v0, and traverses all nodes in a graph (without returning to
the origin) cannot be performed in polynomial time, unless P = NP . We denote this
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problem as path-TSP. We use the path-TSP to show that computing the Shapley value
for the prioritized ride-sharing cannot be done efficiently, unless P = NP .
Theorem 4. There is no polynomial time algorithm that computes the Shapley value
for a given passenger in the prioritized ride-sharing problem unless P = NP .
Proof. Given an instance of the path-TSP problem on a graph G(V,E) we denote the
solution by x. We construct an instance of the non-prioritized ride-sharing problem as
follows. We build a graph G′(V ′, E′), where we add a node v′, i.e., V ′ = V ∪ {v′}. If
e ∈ E then e ∈ E′, and for all v ∈ V , (v, v′) ∈ E′ with a weight of M , where M is
the sum of weights of all the edges in E. Finally, we set |U | = |V |, D = V ′ \ {v0},
d0 = v0, and the drop-off order is arbitrarily chosen. Recall that c(D) is the total travel
cost associated with the chosen drop-off order. We ask to compute the Shapley value of
the user u′ that is associated with the destination v′.
Clearly, the marginal contribution of u′ to any strict subset of V is exactly M .
However, the marginal contribution of u′ to the complete set V is exactly c(D) minus
x (the length of the shortest path starting at v0 and traversing all nodes in V ). That is,
φ(u′) =
(|U | − 1)!
|U |! (c(D)− x) +
|U |!− (|U | − 1)!
|U |! M
After some simple mathematical manipulations we get that x = |U |φ(u′) − (|U | −
1)M+c(D). Therefore, if we can compute φ(u′) in polynomial time then we can solve
the path-TSP problem in polynomial time, which is not possible unless P = NP . uunionsq
Fig. 1. A graph created from a map of the city of Toulouse, France.
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5.2 Shapley Approximation based on a Prioritized Order
In Section 4 we presented a method for efficiently computing the Shapley value when
a prioritization exists. In this section we show that our solution may be also applicable
to the non-prioritized ride-sharing problem as an efficient proxy for the Shapley value.
We term our proxy SHAPO: SHapley Approximation based on a Prioritized Order.
We compare SHAPO with the following three proxies for computing the Shapley
value in traveling salesman games, that are in use in real-world applications [2].
Depot Distance This method divides the total ride cost proportionally to the distance
from the depot, i.e. Depot(ui) =
δ(d0,di)∑n
j=1 δ(d0,dj)
c(D). For example, a passenger travel-
ing to a destination that is twice as distant from the origin as another passenger has to
pay twice the cost, regardless of the actual travel path. We note that this method has
outperformed all other methods in [2] on real data.
Shortcut Distance This method divides the total cost proportional to the change real-
ized by skipping a destination when traversing the given path. Formally, let Cuti =
δ(di−1, di) + δ(di, di+1)− δ(di−1, di+1). Then, Shortcut(ui) = Cuti∑n
j=1 Cutj
c(D).
Re-routed Margin This method is a more sophisticated realization of the shortcut dis-
tance method. That is, instead of using the given path when skipping a destination, we
compute the optimal path. Formally, Reroute(ui) =
c(D)−c(D\{di})∑n
j=1 c(D)−c(D\{dj})c(D). Note
that when evaluating this proxy we need to solve n TSPs, one for leaving out each
destination. This is the only proxy we consider that requires a non-negligible time to
compute.
Experimental Settings In order to evaluate the performance of SHAPO, we evaluated
each of the methods for 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 passengers. For the road network we used
the graph of the city of Toulouse, France1 as presented in Figure 1. This graph includes
the actual distances between the different vertices. To convert the distances to travel
costs we assumed a cost of $1 per kilometer. The graph also includes the Toulouse-
Blagnac airport, which was set as the origin (d0). We cropped the graph to 40, 000
vertices, by running Dijkstra algorithm [7] starting at the airport, sorting all vertices
by their distance from the airport, and removing all farther away vertices (including
those that are unreachable). The destination vertices were randomly sampled for every
passenger using a uniform distribution over all vertices, and each of the methods was
evaluated 100 times against the true Shapley value of all passengers.
For running the simulations we assume that the given order of the passengers is
according to the shortest path. This is a reasonable assumption, since if there is no
prioritization, it is very likely that, in order to reduce the overall cost, the vehicle would
travel using the shortest path (computed once). We conjecture that the results presented
in this paper will carry-out also to situations in which the given passenger order is very
close to being optimal (but not necessarily the exact optimal order), but we leave it for
future investigation.
1 obtained from https://www.geofabrik.de/data/shapefiles_toulouse.
zip
Fair Sharing: The Shapley Value for Ride-Sharing and Routing Games 11
Results Figure 2 presents the running time, in seconds, required to compute the Shap-
ley value and its proxies for all passengers on a single instance (in logarithmic scale). As
expected, we can compute the proxies, except for the Re-routed margin proxy, almost
instantaneously. However, due to the extensive time required to compute the Shapley
value, and since we evaluate each method 100 times, we only evaluate the performance
of all methods with up-to 9 passengers.
Fig. 2. Running time, in seconds, required to compute a single instance of the Shapley value (in
logarithmic-scale).
We evaluate the performance of SHAPO against the three other proxies using 5
different statistical measures (averaged on all 100 iterations). We use X(ui) to denote
the estimated Shapley value by the evaluated proxy.
1. Percent: The average percentage of the deviation from the Shapley value. Formally,
Percent = 1n
∑n
i=1
|X(ui)−φ(ui)|
φ(ui)
.
2. MAE: The mean absolute error, MAE = 1n
∑n
i=1 |X(ui)− φ(ui)|.
3. MSE: The mean squared error, MSE = 1n
∑n
i=1(X(ui)− φ(ui))2. This measure
gives higher weight to larger deviations.
4. RMSE: The root mean squared error, RMSE =
√
1
n
∑n
i=1(X(ui)− φ(ui))2.
5. Max-Error: The maximum deviation among all passengers between the real and
estimated Shapley value, Max = maxni=1(|X(ui)− φ(ui)|).
The results are depicted in Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. SHAPO significantly outperforms
the other proxies in all measures, with any number of passengers evaluated. Despite the
depot distance method outperforming the other two methods, SHAPO is between 5.5
to 42.3 times better than the depot distance in all measures. Note that the units of MAE
and Max-Error are dollars. That is, as depicted in Table 2, SHAPO deviated by only 19
cents, on average, from the actual Shapley value. The depot distance deviated by $1.33,
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 AVG
SHAPO 1.84% 3.44% 4.49% 4.68% 5.27% 6.53% 5.94% 4.60%
Depot Distance 20.02% 26.36% 29.52% 35.28% 35.78% 35.92% 35.91% 31.26%
Shortcut Distance 34.79% 41.55% 45.44% 53.70% 54.23% 53.35% 55.89% 48.42%
Re-routed Margin 84.59% 76.13% 79.65% 119.90% 80.57% 85.97% 72.83% 85.66%
Table 1. Average percentage of the deviation from the Shapley value (Percent). Averaged over
100 iterations. Lower is better.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 AVG
SHAPO $0.11 $0.18 $0.20 $0.20 $0.20 $0.22 $0.21 $0.19
Depot Distance $1.11 $1.29 $1.34 $1.53 $1.38 $1.35 $1.28 $1.33
Shortcut Distance $1.87 $2.19 $2.23 $2.47 $2.27 $2.07 $2.09 $2.17
Re-routed Margin $3.21 $2.81 $2.45 $2.43 $2.10 $2.03 $1.85 $2.41
Table 2. The mean absolute error of the deviation from the Shapley value (MAE). Averaged over
100 iterations. Lower is better.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 AVG
SHAPO 0.068 0.115 0.124 0.098 0.102 0.159 0.117 0.112
Depot Distance 1.988 2.634 3.054 4.130 3.327 3.366 3.066 3.081
Shortcut Distance 5.805 8.431 8.937 10.840 9.749 8.097 7.731 8.513
Re-routed Margin 15.951 12.404 9.587 10.174 7.399 7.168 5.986 9.810
Table 3. The mean squared error of the deviation from the Shapley value (MSE). Averaged over
100 iterations. Lower is better.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 AVG
SHAPO 0.121 0.204 0.239 0.246 0.259 0.299 0.277 0.235
Depot Distance 1.205 1.474 1.594 1.859 1.699 1.703 1.617 1.593
Shortcut Distance 2.112 2.556 2.698 3.068 2.904 2.675 2.662 2.668
Re-routed Margin 3.540 3.200 2.866 2.951 2.517 2.508 2.292 2.839
Table 4. The root mean squared error of the deviation from the Shapley value (RMSE). Averaged
over 100 iterations. Lower is better.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 AVG
SHAPO $0.17 $0.30 $0.39 $0.44 $0.49 $0.62 $0.58 $0.43
Depot Distance $1.66 $2.24 $2.73 $3.44 $3.32 $3.51 $3.47 $2.91
Shortcut Distance $2.81 $3.92 $4.69 $5.66 $5.77 $5.49 $5.56 $4.84
Re-routed Margin $4.81 $4.74 $4.60 $5.32 $4.67 $4.95 $4.71 $4.83
Table 5. The maximum deviation among all passengers between the real and estimated Shapley
value (Max-Error). Averaged over 100 iterations. Lower is better.
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while the averaged shared-ride cost per passenger was approximately $5. Similarly, the
maximal deviation of SHAPO was less than 44 cents (on average), while the maximal
deviation of the depot distance was more than $2.9.
6 Conclusions
The Shapley value is considered one of the most important division scheme of revenues
or costs, but its direct computation is often not practical for a reasonable size game.
Therefore, Mann and Shapely [13] suggest to consider restrictions and constraints in
order to find games where the Shapley value can be efficiently computed. The airport
problem [12] is one example of these games, where the Shapley value can be efficiently
computed. Our prioritized ride-sharing problem is a generalization of the airport prob-
lem to the 2D plane, and we showed that the Shapley can be efficiently computed in this
generalization as well. However, we show that the non-prioritized ride-sharing problem,
which is possibly the next level of generalization, cannot be efficiently computed (un-
less P = NP ). Interestingly, the prioritized ride-sharing can still serve as an efficient
proxy for the Shapley value of the non-prioritized ride-sharing problem where the pro-
vided travel path is the shortest path.
There are several interesting directions for future work. One possible direction is to
compare our proxy for computing the Shapley value in the non-prioritized ride-sharing
problem to a sampling based approach [5]. It is expected that a sampling based ap-
proach will be more accurate if there is a sufficient number of samples, but it will
certainly require a lot more computation time. It is thus interesting to analyze when our
proxy is still better than a sampling-based approach, and when it is the point in which
a sampling-based approach becomes better than our proxy. From a theoretical perspec-
tive, we showed that computing the Shapley value for the non-prioritized ride-sharing
problem is a hard problem. However, the hardness may be derived also from the hard-
ness of path-TSP. There are several polynomial time approximation and heuristics for
TSP that can be adjusted for path-TSP. It is thus interesting to analyze the computa-
tional complexity of finding the Shapley value, where c(S) is computed using one of
these approximations or heuristics.
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